Monetary Union and the Interest-Exchange Rate Trade-off by Bohn, Frank
Monetary Union and the
Interest-Exchange Rate Trade-off
Frank Bohn*
Essex University
May 2003
address:
University of Essex
Department of Economics
Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom
email: fbohn@essex.ac.uk
phone: ++44-1206-87-2394
fax: ++44-1206-87-2724
Monetary Union and the
Interest-Exchange Rate Trade-off
Frank Bohn*
Essex University
May 2003
Abstract
By using a multi-country simulation model this paper analyzes the qualitative
effects of joining a monetary union. The transition to EMU (European Monetary
Union) is shown to produce interest and exchange rate changes with substantial
and countervailing effects on the real economy which can be traced through the
model. Observable anticipation effects in the wake of the EMU are substantiated;
and some policy recommendations for joining any monetary union are derived.
It is also shown that fixing conversion rates at last-day market rates produces a
unique outcome and not exchange rate indeterminacy as argued by de Grauwe
(1997), Obstfeld (1998), and others.
JEL classification: F42, E52; F47
Keywords: monetary union, interest rate equalization, endogenous depreciation
expectations, exchange rate indeterminacy; MULTIMOD, simulation.
Forming or joining a monetary union requires acceptance of a common currency and a
common central bank irrespective of cross-country differences in initial conditions. This
is sometimes called the “one-size-fits-all” problem. From the perspective of an individual
country, the common monetary policy induces interest rate changes relative to interest rates
obtained under national monetary autonomy, because short term nominal interest rates are
equalized across the union. At the same time, national currencies are irrevocably fixed
to the common currency at certain conversion rates. There are, therefore, exchange rate
changes compared to exchange rates that would have prevailed without monetary union.
Nominal interest and nominal exchange rate changes are not exogenous, but depend on
the chosen union-wide central bank policy and on the selected conversion rate procedure,
respectively. They are not shocks in themselves; instead, they are caused by permanent
asymmetric shocks (relative to a situation without monetary union) originating in struc-
tural changes to the underlying monetary policy conditions. At the same time, interest
and exchange rate changes produce macroeconomic effects in a monetary union. To empha-
size their dual role as being caused by shocks on the one hand and causing effects on the
other hand, these nominal changes are henceforth referred to as interest and exchange rate
impulses.
It is a well-known fact that joining or forming a monetary union causes interest and ex-
change rate impulses (in joining countries) which, in turn, produce macroeconomic effects.
Nonetheless, the discussion on the European Monetary Union (EMU) – prior to its start on
1 January 1999 – largely focused on political issues, in particular on which countries were
likely to qualify under the so-called Maastricht Criteria (EU, 1992, articles 109 j (1)). The
Economist (11 April 1998) even complained that the “debate about its potential effects has
been notable for its absence”. This is not entirely true, but some aspects, especially the
aforementioned interest and exchange rate impulses, seem to have been ignored in contri-
butions by economists prior to the formation of the EMU. The same is true with respect
to future potential candidates to the EMU. Again, there has not been any substantive dis-
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cussion of these impulses and their effects on the macroeconomic conditions in prospective
member countries.
Based on the formation of a hypothetical EMU, this paper illustrates that these effects may
be considerable depending on the initial interest and exchange rate conditions. But the
findings of this paper go further than that. Two qualitative results emerge. First, it is shown
why interest and exchange rate impulses are typically countervailing. Contrary to standard
textbook results, it is argued that lower (higher) interest rates are typically associated
with an exchange rate appreciation (depreciation). Prior to monetary union, a country
with a low monetary stability record, for instance, suffers from high interest rates and
depreciation expectations. Once the monetary union has been joined, interest rates equalize
at a lower level and an appreciation is produced because depreciation expectations are
eliminated. The second qualitative result is that the interest rate effect typically dominates
and determines the overall effect on the real economy. A previously low-stability country, for
instance, will gain (i.e. increase its output) from reduced nominal (as well as real) interest
rates, even though the elimination of depreciation expectations causes a nominal (and real)
appreciation.
For empirical and theoretical reasons, these results can only be obtained in a simulation
analysis which is based on both historical data and an elaborate (multi-country) model
structure. On an empirical level, it is crucial to account for the role of historical depreciation
expectations. They would have to be ad hoc in a theoretical model framework. On a
theoretical level, interest and exchange rate impulses can only be captured if the transition
to the monetary union and the period after its actual start are included in one and the
same model. In a multi-country setting, this is virtually impossible within the framework
of a (small) analytically tractable model. Therefore, this paper resorts to a comparative
simulation analysis based on various specifications of a counterfactual European Monetary
Union within the framework of MULTIMOD, the policy analysis model of the International
Monetary Fund.
2
The previous literature on the EMU is quite diverse, but can be categorized according to
how each paper accounts for the features of a monetary union, i.e. its common currency
and its common central bank. In a first strand of papers (written before the start of
the EMU), the monetary union is not modelled explicitly. Hughes Hallett and McAdam
(1997) and von Hagen and Lutz (1996) investigate the macroeconomic repercussions of
attempts to implement the fiscal convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. They use
full scale macroeconomic models (MULTIMOD – also employed here – and the Taylor model,
respectively) to devise fiscal adjustments prior to the start of the EMU. By not modelling the
EMU itself, they ignore, however, interest and exchange rate impulses as well as anticipation
effects caused by the formation of the EMU.
In a second (and larger) strand of papers, specific assumptions are made for the common
currency and the common monetary policy. A stylized macromodel is used by van Aarle,
Engwerda, Plasmans and Weeren (2001) to capture the interdependence of national fiscal
and union-wide monetary policies. Hughes Hallett and Ma (1996) simulate the effects
of fiscal consolidations by using a calibrated Dornbusch model with two small countries
to form a monetary union. Based on the same model, Hughes Hallett and Vines (1993)
advocate fiscal flexibility by analyzing the effects of asymmetric shocks. Masson and Melitz
(1991) arrive at similar conclusions. Based on a three-country-version of MULTIMOD, they
analyze the response to symmetric shocks when national preferences differ. Furthermore,
Clausen (2002) discusses the impact of asymmetric monetary transmission channels in the
EMU, whereas Fielding and Shields (2001) study the correlation of price and output shocks
in a VAR model for countries participating in the CFA Franc zone. Except for the last
(empirical) paper they all theoretically examine a hypothetical EMU after its start. They
do not, however, (nor can they) capture effects caused by the formation of a monetary union:
changes to interest and exchange rates caused by changes in monetary policy and exchange
rate expectations.1
Finally, a third strand of papers focuses on specific problems in the wake of the EMU, in
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particular the question of how to determine the irrevocably fixed conversion rates between
countries. Not only is this issue still interesting from a theoretical point of view, but it is
also relevant with respect to future member countries of the EMU. Clausen (1998) discusses
the “inappropriate choice of the conversion rates” between two small countries by modelling
a “devaluation” within the monetary union.2 In more abstract settings, de Grauwe (1997),
Obstfeld (1998), and de Grauwe, Dewachter, and Veestraeten (1999) argue that there is
a possibility of (rational) self-fulfilling prophecies on exchange rates, if the last quotations
of market rates before the start of a monetary union are to be used as conversion rates
(theoretical indeterminacy problem).
How does this paper relate to and extend the findings of papers of those different strands
of the literature? First, the transition from the pre-EMU period to after the start of the
monetary union is modelled explicitly. This allows to capture interdependencies between
the announcement phase (from the announcement of the EMU to the end of 1998) and
the time after 1 January 1999. Second, various procedures for fixing conversion rates are
discussed. By doing so, results can be applied to the EMU as of 1999, but also to future
members of the real world EMU or any other monetary union. This approach also allows to
evaluate empirically the theoretical indeterminacy problem discussed by de Grauwe (1997)
and others (as discussed in the previous paragraph). Third and most importantly, this
paper focuses on interest and exchange rate impulses caused by a monetary union as such
while abstracting from other potential changes (like fiscal convergence criteria, a shift in the
monetary stability orientation of the European Central Bank (ECB), potential efficiency
gains, or various conceivable adjustments of agents’ behavior).
Sections 1 discusses the model and the simulation strategy; and section 2 presents the model
changes to account for the EMU. On this basis, simulation results for interest and exchange
rate impulses are justified qualitatively in section 3. Section 4 relates the simulation findings
to results obtained in standard open economy macroeconomic models. The role of exchange
rate expectations is emphasized and the view of the advocates of a theoretical indeterminacy
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problem is challenged. Section 5, again, refers to simulation results and discusses real
effects qualitatively. Several channels of transmission are identified and a potential trade-off
between interest and exchange rate impulses is revealed. In section 6, qualitative findings
are applied to the real world EMU. Concluding section 7 presents a summary of results, a
discussion of limitations, and some general policy recommendations referring to countries
joining a monetary union.
1 Experiment Design
In the following, the underlying economic model is characterized and the simulation strategy
of constructing counterfactuals in an ex post analysis is justified.
Main Model and Simulation Characteristics
The simulation analysis presented in this paper is based on a 1991 variant of MULTIMOD
(cf. IMF, 1991), an annual econometric multi-country model. It was developed by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and is widely used for international policy analysis. 470 equations
depict ten countries and regional blocs: the seven G7 countries, the rest of the OECD,
the oil exporters, and the rest of the developing world. MULTIMOD incorporates rational
expectations (in financial markets and the decision-making by firms and households) and
complete information. This means it is a perfect foresight model requiring perfect credibility
of policy decisions (e.g. on the start and membership of a monetary union).
MULTIMOD follows “the prevailing paradigm in which a broadly neoclassical view of mac-
roeconomic equilibrium coexists with a new Keynesian view of short-to-medium term ad-
justment” (Mitchell, Sault, Smith and Wallis, 1995). It is an elaborate, dynamic version
of the “modified-Mundell-Fleming” model (Krugman, 1995) combining short run demand
determination and IS-LM structure with long run steady state properties determined by
capital accumulation and aggregate supply. Inflation dynamics depend on capacity utiliza-
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tion (a Phillips curve type relationship), imported inflation effects, sticky prices and price
expectations. However, for the long run, nominal neutrality is imposed (short run nominal
rigidities are smoothed out over time). MULTIMOD accounts for stocks of debt, money,
and net foreign assets as well as for international trade and financial flows.3
A comparative simulation analysis consists of comparing a benchmark scenario, the so-called
baseline, to various alternative scenarios, here the hypothetical EMU scenarios . In principle,
we can choose to conduct ex post or ex ante simulations (Wallis, 1988, p. 226). The former
are based on a historical time period (and historical baseline data), the latter on the future
(and, hence, forecast baseline data). It is argued that, for the purpose of this paper, ex post
simulations for the 1980s are preferable to the seemingly more realistic (ex ante) scenario
for the EMU starting in 1999, or to any other (ex post) historical scenario.
The decisive drawback of ex ante simulations is that interest and exchange rate impulses
caused by a monetary union would be obscured or even completely concealed. In econometric
multi-country models, forecasts for the immediate future typically represent an adjustment
path to a steady state equilibrium. In this version of MULTIMOD, the steady state is
already reached before the start of the real world EMU in 1999. Exchange rates are constant,
and interest rates are constant and equal across countries from 1997 onwards. Hence three
effects would not appear in an ex ante analysis. (If the steady state were reached a few
years later, that is during the first years of the EMU, effects would still be blurred.) First,
the introduction of a monetary union could not have an interest equalization effect. Second,
underlying appreciations and depreciations in the historical baseline would not feature in a
steady state baseline. Hence, there could not be any effects caused by changes in exchange
rate expectations caused by the hypothetical EMU. Third, conversion rates could be fixed
exogenously at non-steady state values, but there would be no effects under endogenously
determined market conversion rates (because the steady state would prevail). Furthermore,
it could not be demonstrated that these three effects may be countervailing.
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Simulation Scenarios
There are also reasons for choosing a particular historical time period, i.e. the 1980s instead
of the 1990s, for introducing a hypothetical EMU. After 1983, the European Monetary Sys-
tem (EMS) was fairly stable, whereas monetary turmoil with the break-up of the Exchange
Rate Mechanism and ensuing exchange rate instability, especially for the Lira, could be
observed in the beginning of the 1990s. After 1992, the baseline scenario was affected by
expectations caused by the announcement of the EMU. The real side, too, was suitable for
conducting a simulation analysis based on the 1980s. From 1983, GDP growth rates were
positive and very close in the large real world EMU member countries Italy, France and
Germany (baseline data is shown in appendix A), not so much in Britain though. Hence,
possible recession or overheating effects caused by a hypothetical EMU cannot be blamed
on divergent underlying business cycles.
Nonetheless, by choosing the historical conditions of the 1980s as the point of reference,
considerable nominal disparities among European countries (much larger than in the 1990s)
are incorporated in the analysis. Due to large interest rate differentials between prospective
member countries of the hypothetical EMU and exchange rates far away from Purchasing
Power Parity, large adjustments are likely to be induced by the introduction of a hypothetical
EMU. Hence, quantitative outcomes are exaggerated and less ambiguous, and qualitative
interpretations are facilitated. Synchronized business cycles and large nominal disparities
provide ideal conditions for analyzing transmission mechanisms of macroeconomic effects
that are caused by the EMU (or monetary unions in general).
All in all, the baseline scenario is defined by the model specifications in MULTIMOD to
capture the historical real world situation. The hypothetical EMU scenarios are to be
distinguished from the baseline scenario in the following section. They are all modelled to
start in 1983 and to consist of the real world EMU member countries Germany, France and
Italy, but not the United Kingdom. (The smaller European countries are not accounted for
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separately in this version of MULTIMOD.) The decision on which country to include in the
hypothetical EMU is not primarily motivated by the desire to honor the successful bid by
Italy and the refusal by Britain to participate in the real world EMU. Instead, it has already
been motivated by the macroeconomic constellation as of 1983.
The start of the hypothetical EMU in 1983 is preceded by a one year announcement period
(1982). It may be argued that markets predicted EMU membership for most countries more
than one year in advance, and that future applications for membership will be known at
least two years in advance. However, since MULTIMOD requires perfect credibility and
full information (as mentioned before), the most realistic assumption is to limit the an-
nouncement period to one year. As a consequence, real world anticipation effects may be
exaggerated by simulation results, because expectations switch abruptly from one (annual)
period to the next and all adjustments are squeezed into one period only. Furthermore,
the announcement period is characterized by flexible exchange rates. The idea is to cap-
ture anticipation effects unrestrained by government interventions in the foreign exchange
markets.
2 Monetary Union
A common currency and a common central bank are the essential components of a monetary
union. In the following, exchange rates and monetary policy in the hypothetical EMU
are discussed with reference to the baseline. Three hypothetical EMU scenarios based on
alternative procedures for fixing intra-EMU conversion rates are specified.
Exchange Rates
In MULTIMOD, exchange rates are determined by the open interest parity condition (rela-
tive to the US). In the baseline, there are separate exchange rate equations for France,
Germany, and Italy. For the hypothetical EMU scenarios, individual exchange rates for
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member countries are replaced by a single Euro-$ rate (and conversion rates are used to fix
each national currency to the Euro). The exchange rate of the (hypothetical) Euro vis-a`-vis
the US-$ depends on two components: the expected Euro-$ exchange rate for next period
EeU+1 (E is the expectation operator); and the differential between the union-wide short
term interest rate iU (determined by the ECB) and the corresponding US rate iUS. The
European (open interest parity) exchange rate equation is given by:
eU =
(
1 + i
US
100
)
∗ EeU+1(
1 + i
U
100
) (1)
Normalizing the Euro at 1 DM as of 1983, the start of the hypothetical EMU, reduces the
number of conversion rates needed. Three alternative procedures for fixing conversion rates
are used in this paper. To stay within the logic of an annual model, all rules refer to yearly
averages. As an example, the conversion rate between France (F) and Germany (G), eF,Gt≥1983
(French Franc to the Euro or DM), is specified for each case:
CUR: eF,Gt≥1983
[
FF
Euro
]
= eF,G1982 (2)
PPP: eF,Gt≥1983
[
FF
Euro
]
=
pppF1980
pppG1980
∗ P
F
1982
PG1982
(3)
CP: eF,Gt≥1983
[
FF
Euro
]
= cpF1982 (4)
CUR means conversion at current exchange rates: conversion rates as of 1983 are set to
their corresponding simulated bilateral exchange rates as of 1982, the year before the start
of the hypothetical EMU. An equivalent conversion procedure in the real world would be the
fixing at (annually) averaged market rates. Hence, CUR must be interpreted as an averaging
procedure suggested by Lamfalussy, the first president of the former European Monetary
Institute. In terms of model simulations, CUR conversion rates are entirely endogenous,
because simulated rates as of 1982 are used, not baseline rates. PPP and CP are labelled
exogenous conversion procedures. Under PPP, the purchasing power of 1 Euro is equalized
across countries. The PPP procedure uses exogenously determined 1980 estimates for the
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purchasing power parity (pppk1980) of, say France (F) and Germany (G) relative to the US.
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They are updated by 1982 prices (P k1980) which are endogenously obtained in the respective
simulation run. According to CP, conversion rates correspond to the annual averages of
central parities cpk of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). These are entirely
exogenous to the model.
None of these corresponds to the conversion procedure chosen for the actual EMU at the EU
Summit in May 1998 (EU, 1998), because exchange and conversion rates in MULTIMOD
are yearly averages. Nonetheless, exogenous CP and endogenous CUR together capture all
important features of the actual conversion procedure used in the real world EMU. In fact,
the real world procedure could be considered an intermediate case of CP and CUR. It is
exogenous in the sense that bilateral (not Euro) conversion rates are fixed in advance at the
central parities of the ERM. It is endogenous, because in most countries bilateral central
parities do actually reflect economic fundamentals and correspond to market rates. When
there was a large deviation, as in the case of the Irish pound before 16 March 1998, central
parities were adjusted. As an additional reference, the PPP procedure is used to better
represent real economic conditions in each of the member countries.
Interest Rates
As for monetary policy in MULTIMOD’s baseline, the behavior of the Bundesbank and
the non-ERM central banks is described by monetary targeting. All other ERM member
countries are assumed to commit to exchange rate targeting vis-a`-vis the DM. Once the
hypothetical EMU starts, the nominal interest rate in member countries is no longer deter-
mined by a national interest rate reaction function, but by the interest rate reaction function
of the hypothetical ECB. The ECB commits to monetary targeting. There is no conceptual
change like, for instance, a switch to inflation targeting. The common European interest
rate is modelled as the instrument, and the European money stock as the (intermediate)
target for obtaining its price stability objective. As for previously national central banks,
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the hypothetical ECB exercises full control over short term interest rates:
iU = iU−1 +
[
r ∗ ln mt
U
MU
]
. (5)
Under the assumption of unchanged (negative) coefficient r (from national equations), the
change of the union-wide common interest rate (iU − iU−1) depends on aggregate European
money MU (M refers to both money demand and money supply in MULTIMOD), and
on the construction of exogenous European monetary target mtU (see below). Under the
assumption of behavioral invariability, the aggregated European money stock is derived as
the sum of its components, i.e. MU =
∑ Mk
ek,G
t≥1983
. (As above, ek,Gt≥1983 is the fixed conversion
rate in the union used to express the quantity of money for each member country k in terms
of the common currency Euro or DM.) The monetary stability orientation of a central bank
is expressed by the time path of its exogenous monetary target (mtt). Given the level of
money MU in equation 5, the European interest rate is determined by (changes in) the
monetary stability orientation of the hypothetical ECB. An expansionary (contractionary)
policy – implying lower (higher) union-wide interest rates – is caused by increasing (lowering)
the level of mtU relative to the level of MU .
EMU means – by definition of a monetary union – a single monetary policy, but allows
for various levels of union-wide monetary stability orientation. From the perspective of
an individual country, the change in stability orientation is caused by equalizing monetary
policy on an average level and (possibly) by shifting away from that average. A union-wide
shift to a higher level of stability orientation a` la Bundesbank, for instance, or to a lower
level is not captured in this paper. In the approach chosen, the monetary policy of the
hypothetical EMU is constructed as the ’average’ of historical national monetary policies.
Formally, a monetary target is specified in MULTIMOD for each country, even for ERM
member countries committing to exchange rate targeting (so that the withdrawal of indi-
vidual countries from the ERM could be modelled). It corresponds to the actual monetary
policy in the historical baseline. Thus, the ’average’ monetary policy of the hypothetical
ECB is determined endogenously by aggregating national baseline targets (analogous to the
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aggregation of the European money stock): mtU =
∑ mtk
ek,U
t≥1983
.
This approach may be criticized from two angles. First, the real world EMU has already
shown to conduct more stability-oriented monetary policies. It has been said before, how-
ever, that it is not intended to model a realistic European Monetary Union. Second, simply
adding up national target values given in the baseline of MULTIMOD is a crude way for
describing the hypothetical ECB policy as an average of historical European monetary poli-
cies. Nonetheless, this procedure suffices to capture a crucial feature of any monetary union,
the equalization of short term nominal interest rates.
3 Simulation Results 1: Interest and Exchange Rates
Simulation results for the hypothetical EMU relative to the baseline (cf. appendices A
and B) hinge on impulses of nominal interest and nominal exchange rates caused by any
monetary union. Conceptually, the causes for these nominal impulses (this section and
section 4), and their transmission in the real economy (section 5) can be distinguished.
Once the features of each of the impulses are understood (this section), their countervailing
nature is interpreted in the light of results from standard open economy models (section
4). On this basis, the transmission of impulses and their countervailing real effects can be
discussed (section 5).
Interest Rate Impulses
The link between the common monetary policy and equalized short term interest rates is
straightforward. In the simulations, averaging the monetary stability orientation of the
ECB (compared to the policy stance of the – formerly independent – national central banks)
produces average interest rates across the union from 1983 onwards. Relative to national
baseline rates, each year interest rates fall in countries with historically high interest rates
(e.g. Italy) and go up in those with traditionally low interest rates (Germany). As a result,
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interest-sensitive national money demand (hence MU) as well as the real side are affected.
A reduction of nominal interest rates, for instance, is similar to expansionary monetary
policy in a national country setting and is likely to produce overall stimulating effects in the
country in question. Hence mere averaging of the monetary stability orientation in Europe
produces macroeconomic effects in each year – relative to the baseline.
However, from the perspective of the national country, the link between a change in national
monetary stability orientation relative to the baseline and a change in interest rates is not
straightforward. It depends on the relative level of interest rates in member countries.
Typically, a country with a historically low monetary stability record (like Italy) exhibits
high nominal interest rates in the baseline. Hence, if nominal interest rates are averaged in
the union, they decrease for that country, even though its monetary stability orientation rises
relative to the baseline. (In section 5, it is shown that real interest rates do not necessarily
go down, too.) Nominal interest rate figures presented in appendices A and B confirm this
finding for the three hypothetical EMU scenarios analyzed in this paper. To make use of
the result further down a generalization is given in
Observation 1 (Interest Rate Impulse) A member country of a monetary union expe-
riences short term interest rate impulses due to the common monetary policy in the union.
– Interest rate impulses for historically low-stability countries (e.g. Italy) are likely to be
expansionary (reduced nominal interest rates), even though – from a national perspective –
the monetary stability orientation rises.
Exchange Rate Impulses under CUR
Figure 1 offers a stylized representation of changes to exchange rates vis-a`-vis the US-$
(cf. simulated data in appendix A) caused by the hypothetical EMU under CUR (within
the framework of MULTIMOD). The downward and upward sloping straight lines depict
baseline exchange rates for a historically strong currency (DM) and a weaker currency (FF
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Figure 1: Exchange Rates under CUR (Stylized)
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or Lira), respectively. The figure captures two diagrams: one for FF-$ rates, one for DM-$
rates. Ordinates are adjusted (scales differ) so that the baseline curves intersect in 1983,
the start year of the hypothetical EMU.
The two dashed lines represent the simulated outcome from 1983 onwards; i.e. two rep-
resentations of the Euro-$ exchange rate (cf. section 2): DM-$ (= 1 * Euro-$ – due to
normalization), FF-$ (= FFConversionRate * Euro-$). The dotted lines depict the antici-
pation effect in 1982. Under CUR, there is an appreciation relative to the baseline for the
FF and a depreciation for the DM, throughout. This applies for the anticipation period, too.
Simulated conversion rates differ from bilateral 1983 baseline exchange rates, so that the
(simulated) curves in figure 1 do not intersect any more. Both curves lie between baseline
curves when moving out to the right. Note also that the distance between the two curves
capturing simulation results must be “constant” from 1983 onwards, because conversion
rates are fixed and interest rates are identical in the hypothetical EMU.5
Actual simulation results under CUR (presented in appendix A) correspond to the stylized
representation in figure 1. France and Italy experience appreciations, Germany depreciations
relative to their national currency in the baseline. Exchange rate impulses become stronger
from period to period in the early years of the hypothetical EMU, but persist on a more or
less constant level from 1986/1987, i.e. exchange rates to the US-$ relative to the baseline
remain constant. Considering the magnitudes of appreciations/depreciations relative to the
baseline, this is a very strong empirical result (based on an econometric model and the
conditions of the 1980s). As it will be referred to later, this result for the endogenous
conversion procedure CUR is summarized in
Observation 2 (Exchange Rate Impulse under CUR) In a monetary union with con-
version rates determined by the market, a country with an originally weak (strong) national
currency typically experiences appreciative (depreciative) exchange rate impulses.
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Exchange Rate Impulses under PPP and CP
The underlying causality is different for endogenous (CUR) and exogenous conversion rate
procedures (PPP and CP). Relative exchange rate impulses between two member countries
(from 1983) can be represented by the simple quotient of baseline and simulated cross rate
identities:
eFt (s)
eFt (b)
=
(
eGt (s)
eGt (b)
)
∗
(
eF,Gt (s)
eF,Gt (b)
)
, (6)
where ekt (l) refers to the exchange rate (at time t) of country k (k = G for Germany and
k = F for France – in local currency per US-$) with l indicating whether it is a simulated
(l = s) or a baseline (l = b) exchange rate. Cross rates are expressed by eF,Gt (l). Simulated
cross rates are either endogenous (with eF,Gt (s) flexible) or exogenous (with e
F,G
t (s) = e
F,G
t (s)
fixed).
Under PPP or CP (relative to the baseline), the French Franc (vis-a`-vis the US-$) appre-
ciates by comparison to the the DM
(
eFt (s)
eFt (b)
<
eGt (s)
eGt (b)
)
, if and only if the exogenously given
bilateral conversion rate
(
eF,Gt (s)
)
is revalued relative to the corresponding bilateral base-
line exchange rate
(
eF,Gt (b)
)
. This is a mere tautology. However, it pinpoints the difference
between (endogenously determined) market conversion rates (CUR procedure) and pur-
chasing power rates or central parities which are imposed under the PPP or CP conversion
procedures, respectively. The next observation is straightforward:
Observation 3 (Exchange Rate Impulse under Exogenous Conversion Procedures)
In a monetary union with exogenously fixed conversion rates, relative exchange rate impulses
between two member countries can be produced by the (political) choice of the conversion rate.
4 Interpretation 1: Simulation versus Analytical Results
Despite this difference in the underlying causality between CUR and exogenous conversion
procedures PPP and CP, the FF and the Lira appreciate by comparison to the DM in all
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cases – relative to the baseline. In fact, PPP results (cf. appendix B) are very similar
to those under CUR. These results raise two questions. Why is there such a similarity
between simulation results for an endogenous and an exogenous conversion procedure? Can
we reconcile that FF and Lira exchange rates appreciate relative to the baseline, even though
interest rates go down – relative to the baseline? (Conversely, we could ask why the DM
exchange rate depreciates when interest rates increase.)
These questions are answered in reverse order. First, the link between interest and ex-
change rates is discussed in the light of results from standard open economy macroeconomic
models. It is claimed that standard model results cannot be applied to the problem of
forming or joining a monetary union because expectations must be adjusted for in a way
they are not in such models. Second, it is argued that the CUR conversion procedure en-
dogenously produces the same adjustment of expectations as the PPP procedure imposes
exogenously. This explains why results for CUR and exogenous conversion procedures can
be very similar. Third, it is then asserted, however, that the CP conversion procedure is
actually fundamentally different (to both CUR and PPP).
The Role of Depreciation Expectations
The link between interest and exchange rates is analyzed in the standard theoretical lit-
erature (take the monetary model, the Mundell-Fleming model or the Dornbusch model).
In these models, we learn that expansionary monetary policy is typically associated with
both a nominal depreciation and either lower or constant interest rates.6 Simulation results
in this paper seem to contradict all of these models: countries with a fall in interest rates
experience an appreciation, not a depreciation.
Even though exchange rates are fixed with the start of the monetary union, the comparison
to (but not an application of) the aforementioned analytical models is still possible. For
instance, the simulation under CUR captures a shift in monetary policy for each country
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in the year prior to the start of the monetary union (i.e. the announcement period). As
exchange rates are fixed at the endogenously determined rate in that year, changes in bilat-
eral exchange rates are ruled out and interest rates are already equalized in that year (due
to the open interest parity condition). In theoretical terms, we could say that simulation
results reflect an immediate jump to the long run equilibrium starting in the year prior to
the start of the monetary union. Even though national monetary targets have not changed
in the announcement period, interest rates decrease in France and Italy, produce expansion-
ary effects, and should, therefore, cause a depreciation. In Germany, higher interest rates
should cause an appreciation.
This is not so, however, because the model baseline incorporates depreciation expectations
for France and Italy relative to Germany (as well as to other countries) which are not
captured in the theoretical models. (The same is true for appreciation expectations for the
DM.) These expectations are based on the historical development of exchange rates.7 By
forming or joining a monetary union, these expectations become void. Thus, freed from
depreciation expectations, simulation results show large appreciations for France and Italy
– relative to the baseline. The elimination of bilateral depreciation expectations (here, for
France and Italy) is a reflection of imported monetary stability due to the membership in
the monetary union.
In the short and long run, there are – relative to the baseline – two potentially countervailing
effects on the real economy. On the one hand, there is an expansionary effect (if the reduction
in nominal interest rates translates into falling real interest rates – relative to the baseline).
On the other hand, there is a contractionary impact caused by the appreciation (if the
nominal appreciation is also a real one – relative to the baseline). The overall effect is not
clear a priori and will be investigated in section 5.
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The Role of Purchasing Power Parities
Based on the previous analysis of the link between interest and exchange rates, we can
now turn to the discussion of similarities between results for endogenous and exogenous
conversion procedures. Depreciation expectations for the FF and Lira imply that, in the
baseline, FF and Lira are undervalued – based on the open interest parity. The opposite
applies for the DM in the baseline. The PPP conversion procedure enforces a correction by
imposing purchasing power parity exchange rates. The interesting result is that the CUR
conversion procedure produces a very similar correction: near purchasing power parity rates
are endogenously obtained. For two reasons, this makes sense. First, markets are freed from
depreciation (appreciation) expectations caused by differences in monetary policy in the
historical baseline. Second, the long run in the simulation model does not incorporate
differential productivity or growth prospects.
Observation 4 (The Link between CUR and PPP Conversion Procedures) Weak
currencies are undervalued because of depreciation expectations caused by historically low
monetary stability. Forming or joining a monetary union eliminates these expectations.
If conversion rates are determined by the market, they turn out to be close to purchasing
power parities. Hence CUR and PPP conversion procedures produce similar macroeconomic
results.
Obtaining near purchasing power parity rates under the market mechanism (i.e. the CUR
conversion procedure) contradicts the theoretical indeterminacy problem: de Grauwe (1997),
Obstfeld (1998), and de Grauwe, Dewachter, and Veestraeten (1999) argue that there is a
possibility of (rational) self-fulfilling prophecies (on exchange rates), if the last quotations
of market rates before the start of a monetary union are to be used as conversion rates.
This is exactly the procedure used for CUR (irrespective of the fact that annual data is
used here). The simulation results in this paper show, however, that there is no such
indeterminacy problem once economic interdependencies of a large model are incorporated
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in the analysis. In fact, one and only one outcome obtains in a perfect foresight setting.
This is so, because the conversion rate in MULTIMOD must be consistent with a long run
goods market equilibrium which requires “reasonable” exchange rates with respect to the
real side.
For two reasons, the finding of near-purchasing power parity conversion rates under CUR is
not just coincidental, but a strong empirical result. First, the solution is far away from the
start values of the simulation run. Second, each simulation result is the outcome of hundreds
of iterative loops of a forward-looking algorithm which has proved to be very robust.8
Differences for Central Parities
Under CP (cf. appendix B), there is a qualitative difference. The DM appreciates vis-a`-vis
the US-$ (not as much as the FF or Lira though) in the first years of the hypothetical EMU
relative to the baseline. However, after 1985 the DM depreciates and crosses the unity line in
1987 (i.e. there is no change relative to the baseline). Also note that Lira and FF exchange
rates to the US-$ remain almost constant between 1985 and 1987 relative to the baseline,
although there was a reinforced appreciation under CUR.
These features result from the fact that exogenous CP conversion rates do not have any
economic justification. That is why the CP procedure is actually very different to CUR
and PPP. Under CP, there is a conflict between the steady state properties in the long run
and imposed central parity conversion rates from 1983 which are taken from outside the
model. A split outcome obtains to reconcile the restriction in the short run and the long
run requirement. In the longer term, the DM depreciates, and the FF and Lira appreciate
relative to the baseline (similar to CUR). In the short run, they cannot diverge as much
as required and possible under market conditions (CUR). All currencies appreciate. The
medium term (most visibly, the years 1986 and 1987) is a period of adjustment. German
exchange rates – relative to the baseline – appreciate by more, Italian and French ones by
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less than under CUR.
5 Simulation Results 2: Impulse Transmission and Real Effects
Causes for interest and exchange rate impulses produced by any monetary union have been
explored in the previous two sections and the results have been summarized in observations
1 to 4. Comparing the (historical) baseline to hypothetical EMU scenarios in a simulation
analysis produces results which contradict those obtained in standard open economy models.
The introduction of a monetary union is shown to produce an appreciation and lower interest
rates in Italy and France, i.e. countervailing (contractionary) exchange and (expansionary)
interest rate effects. Germany experiences just the opposite (except for the case of the CP
scenario).
This section captures the transmission of impulses into real variables as revealed by the
simulation analysis. First, relevant transmission effects are discussed for each country under
CUR, PPP, and CP scenarios. Then, a potential trade-off between interest and exchange
rate impulses is brought out.
The Transmission of Impulses in Germany under CUR
In all scenarios, the transmission of interest and exchange rate impulses into the real economy
can be summarized as follows:
Observation 5 (Transmission Mechanisms) Interest and exchange rate impulses pro-
duce real effects, which can be explained by three transmission mechanisms: a competition
effect, a terms of trade effect, and a real interest rate effect.
As an example for observation 5, effects on the real economy are presented for Germany –
under CUR – in figure 2. The representation of simulation findings is simplified by focusing
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Figure 2: Transmission of Impulses in Germany under CUR
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on the three already mentioned transmission mechanisms: a positive competition effect, a
negative terms of trade effect on income and wealth, and a real interest rate effect that is
positive in the short run, but negative in the medium and long run. The overall impact on
German GDP is positive at first, but turns negative after 1985.
Relative to the baseline, the depreciation of the DM raises prices for imports, thereby causing
imported inflation. Since prices are sticky, future inflation goes up as well, so do inflation
expectations (P̂ e ↑) due to rational expectations. Hence, by definition, real interest rates
r are lowered. However, at rising nominal interest rates, the net effect on German real
rates is ambiguous a priori. In the short run, strong interest rate equalization effects are
overcompensated due to even stronger effects on expected inflation. In the medium term,
however, elevated nominal interest rates relative to the baseline dominate the behavior of
real rates.
Even though real interest rates decrease in the announcement period and in the first years
of the hypothetical EMU, German private investment I and consumption C (government
consumption g is exogenous) stay below baseline levels throughout. This is due to a negative
terms of trade effect lowering real wealth W and real disposable income Y D. National
purchasing power is reduced. Nonetheless, German GDP increases up to 1985 because of
a boost to trade caused by the real depreciation. This competition effect is caused by
the nominal depreciation which clearly dominates the countervailing effect of rising prices
(dashed line in figure 2). Notwithstanding the lasting nature of the positive trade effect
(trade balance TB ↑), the contractionary impact of rising nominal and real interest rates
determines the overall outcome in Germany in the medium and long run.
Supply side aspects (which are not captured in figure 2) reinforce the inflationary impact
of the DM depreciations. Since the capital stock is systematically run down (relative to
the baseline), and output increases in the announcement period and the beginning of the
hypothetical EMU, capacity utilization rises until 1985 – relative to the baseline. Inflation
caused by capacity utilization effects (according to the Phillips curve relationship) augments
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imported inflation effects. As seen above, inflation causes real interest rates to decrease in
the first years despite higher nominal interest rates. After 1985, capacity utilization returns
to baseline levels, thus eliminating additional inflation effects in Germany.
Impulse Transmission in the Other Cases
The transmission of impulses in France is basically a mirror image of those in Germany
except that the trade balance is positive in the first few years. Nonetheless, contractionary
effects in the short run are stronger than corresponding expansionary ones in Germany.
This is possible because of the rather moderate relative decrease of nominal interest rates
reflecting the intermediate position of French interest rates in the historical baseline.
In Italy, results are much more clear-cut than in France and Germany. Throughout there is
a negative competition effect, a positive terms-of-trade effect, and a very strong positive real
interest rate effect. Overall, GDP is permanently above baseline levels. Despite a build-up of
capital, capacity utilization increases (thereby pushing up costs). The ensuing inflationary
impact (due to the Phillips curve relationship) is strong enough to cancel out imported
disinflation effects. At inflation near baseline rates and sharply decreasing nominal interest
rates, clearly, the real interest rate effect on output must be positive and very strong.
Most impulses, effects, and results (as discussed for CUR) prevail, qualitatively, under
exogenous conversion procedures. The interest rate impulse remains almost unchanged,
because interest equalization invariably applies to all conversion procedure. In contrast
to CUR, the PPP or CP exchange rate impulse is affected by fixed conversion rates. In
particular, depreciation impulses are considerably smaller for France under PPP, and for
France and Italy under CP. As a result, effects are dampened, but not drastically changed.
The situation is different for Germany under CP. There is a nominal appreciation until
1986 – in contrast to the permanent depreciation under CUR. The appreciation causes a
switching of signs for most variables in the short to medium term in figure 2. In the an-
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nouncement period and the first few years of the hypothetical EMU, disinflation is imported
and reinforced by capacity utilization below baseline levels. As a result, the real interest
rate effect on absorption is negative in those years, not positive as under CUR. Despite a
positive terms-of-trade effect in these first years (due to imported inflation), absorption falls
throughout – relative to the baseline. Overall economic activity measured by GDP perma-
nently stays below baseline levels, although the trade balance is more positive during the
entire period. (In the years with appreciations relative to the baseline, the competition effect
remains positive because appreciations are overcompensated by the ensuing disinflation.)
The Interest-Exchange Trade-Off
Nominal impulses in terms of interest and exchange rates are the determinants of real effects
caused by the EMU – relative to the baseline. In the case of an appreciation combined with
a rise in interest rates, as for Germany under CP, the effect was unambiguously negative
(except for the smaller terms of trade effect). In all other cases, there was a potential trade-
off, either between depreciations and interest rate rises relative to the baseline, or between
appreciations and a drop in interest rates.
In a trade-off situation, real interest rates seem to be decisive, empirically. If one of the
nominal impulses determines the effect on the real interest rate r and produces a large
change in r relative to the baseline, then the overall outcome is governed by the real interest
effect. As an example, take the nominal interest impulse in Italy. Under all conversion
procedures, it is so powerful, that real interest rates clearly decrease in most periods (or are
close to the baseline – in some periods under CP and PPP). As a result, Italy gains under
all conversion procedures. These empirical findings are summed up in
Observation 6 (Real Effects) Real macroeconomic effects for individual countries form-
ing or joining a monetary union depend on a potential trade-off between interest and ex-
change rate impulses. Typically, a decisive change in real interest rates determines the
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overall outcome.
The trade-off – with respect to effects on the real economy – between interest and exchange
rates is conventional wisdom. It clearly depends on the openness of a national economy. But
there seems to be almost no empirical or theoretical literature. In particular, no attempt has
been made, to my knowledge, to apply a formal trade-off argument to the real world EMU.
Only McRae (1998) mentions – with wrong numbers though – a so-called “four-to-one rule
of thumb that is sometimes applied to the UK (four percentage points on the [real] effective
exchange rate are equivalent to one point on [real] interest rates)”.9
However, the trade-off discussed in this paper refers to nominal variables. It is a qualitative
description of simulation results. The diagram in figure 3 presents the impact of nominal
interest and exchange rate impulses on GDP – relative to the baseline – in a stylized way.
It shows that effects are unambiguous in the first and third quadrant, but countervailing in
the others. No quantitative results are presented, because it is not claimed that a regular
relationship or even a law was discovered. In fact, the trade-off is likely to depend on
economic conditions, the time period, and the temporal link (e.g. a lag) to the original
impulse. The dividing line between positive and negative GDP effects may be jagged or
fuzzy.
Under CUR and within the framework of figure 3, Italy is positioned in the fourth quadrant
and moves up right over time, but stays well within the area of positive GDP effects.
France, in the same quadrant, starts out in the area of negative GDP effects, but ends up
in the shaded area, although her position moves up right as well. (The overall GDP effect
for France after 10 years remains negative though.) The German position in the second
quadrant changes from the shaded area to the area associated with negative GDP effects –
despite the fact that the interest rate decreases relative to the baseline (leftward movement)
and the depreciation slightly increases over time (downward movement). By expanding the
model, it could be attempted to get a quantitatively better understanding of the actual
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Figure 3: Nominal Impulses and Real Effects (Stylized)
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trade-off between interest and exchange rate impulses in a monetary union relative to a
situation without monetary union. This task must be left for future research.
6 Interpretation 2: Real World EMU
Simulation results depend on assumptions of the underlying model MULTIMOD, on how
the EMU is taken account of in this paper, and on the historical baseline. There is almost
unlimited scope for alterations and extensions of the simulation exercise. In particular,
changes of private agents’ behavior could be incorporated in the analysis to account for
the Lucas Critique. For instance, the higher degree of monetary stability experienced in
some countries due to the formation of the real world EMU (e.g. in Italy) is likely to have
raised private money holdings, and additional financial opportunities could have affected
the interest sensitivity of money demand in individual member countries.
Furthermore, monetary and fiscal policies could be modelled to conform more closely to
the real world situation of the real world EMU. A fiscal consolidation (cf. Bohn, 2002)
and a more stability-oriented hypothetical ECB would have to be included in the analysis.
However, in this paper the focus is on fundamental impulses and their transmission effects
and trade-offs, not on the correct description of and quantitative predictions for the actual
EMU. Nonetheless, the relevance of qualitative simulation findings for the real world Eu-
ropean Monetary Union is discussed in this section by asking four questions. They relate
to the existence of interest and exchange rate impulses in the real world EMU (question
1); anticipation effects in the run-up to the real world EMU (question 2); macroeconomic
effects after its start in 1999 (question 3); and the decisions taken at the EU Summit in
Brussels on 2 May 1998 (question 4).
Note that simulation results and findings of the analysis are based on relating hypothetical
EMU scenarios to a reference scenario, the historical baseline. However, for the observable
real world scenario of the actual EMU, there is no readily available reference scenario.
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Instead, based on conjectures, a conceptual scenario with no plans for a monetary union
must be constructed (in one’s mind’s eye).
Question 1: Do the underlying economic (policy) conditions for the actual EMU resemble
those found in the simulations?
More precisely, the question is if the change from the aforementioned conceptual scenario
to the real world EMU corresponds qualitatively to the change from the historical baseline
to the hypothetical EMU scenarios as postulated in the simulation exercise. The economic
conditions in the real world are likely to differ from those in the conceptual scenario. How
do nominal interest and exchange rates differ? These two nominal impulses were shown to
trigger the effects on the real economy in the simulations on the hypothetical EMU – relative
to the baseline. To assess their role in the actual EMU the question can, therefore, be split
into two parts: (i) would noteworthy short term interest differentials have remained, if the
real world EMU had not been announced in 1992 nor set up in 1999 (conceptual scenario);
(ii) are there reasons that justify deviations of conversion rates in the real world EMU
from bilateral exchange rates in the conceptual scenario without EMU? Both questions are
answered with a clear yes.
Consider nominal short term interest differentials first. Interest rates observed a few years
before the start of the EMU in 1999 already incorporate changes in monetary policy in
prospective member countries conducted in anticipation of the start of the real world EMU.
Table 1 presents nominal interest rates at various points in time prior to the start of the
actual EMU. The interest differential for Germany and Spain, for instance, has shrunk to
1.13 % in January 1998. If interest rates for a situation without the EMU (conceptual
scenario) are to be conjectured, one must look at rates prior to the announcement of the
real world EMU. In 1992, the year of the Maastricht Treaty, interest rate differentials are
large between the Southern countries (e.g. Spain and Italy) and the more stability-oriented
so-called core countries, especially Germany, (Austria, and the Netherlands could be added),
but also France (since the ’Franc Fort’ policies eventually lead to low interest rates in the
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Table 1: Nominal Short Term Interest Rates prior to EMU
Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, January 2003, April 1998, July 1993, July 1983
(nominal short term interest rates [in percent])
early 1990s). The data may be seen as evidence for considerable differentials (between
European countries) that would have prevailed – at least to some extent – in a conceptual
scenario without EMU.10 On this basis, the real world EMU is likely to have caused and still
cause large interest rate impulses relative to the conceptual scenario – qualitatively identical
to those found in the simulation runs conducted in this paper.
As to exchange rates, consider changes in long term monetary stability (cf. section 3).
Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, a formidable effort towards harmonization of monetary
policies – at a high level of stability – can be observed. Monetary stability convergence
implies less pressure for currencies of low stability countries. In fact, central parities of the
ERM which were used as conversion rates in the real world EMU did not have to be changed
for most countries after 1992.11 By contrast, in the conceptual scenario without monetary
union, there is no reason why monetary stability policies would have harmonized to such
a degree in so many European countries. Thus, bilateral exchange rates in a hypothetical
situation without the prospect of the EMU (i.e. the conceptual scenario) might well have
differed (at least in some countries) from actual conversion rates used in the real world
EMU. Thus, relative to the conceptual scenario, the real world exchange rate impulses, too,
are likely to be qualitatively identical to those found in the simulations.
Question 2: Do anticipation effects observed in the run-up to the real world EMU corre-
spond to anticipation effects produced by the simulations?
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It has already been mentioned that the model does not exactly capture the real world
situation. In reality, the period between announcement and actual start of the EMU was
longer. Also, there was uncertainty about the prospect of the EMU project altogether.
Hence, anticipated adjustments are likely to be more clear-cut in simulations, with stronger
level effects, but less volatility (in an annual model) than in the run-up to the real world
EMU.
However, qualitatively, there is strong real world evidence to confirm anticipation effects
found in the simulations. Depending on political events and on market expectations on the
prospects of the (real world) EMU as well as on participating countries, long run interest
rate differentials between potential EMU countries changed drastically (cf. IMF, 2001 and
1998). For instance, the long rate differential for Germany and Italy came down to 3.5 % in
1994, widened again to 5.3 % in 1995 (when Italy’s participation in the EMU seemed less
likely) and was down at 0.3 % in February 1998 (when markets were convinced that Italy
would be a member).
The effect of narrowing long run interest differentials is captured in the simulations. Under
all conversion procedures, long rates in all EMU countries equalize around 13 % (CP: 12.5)
in 1983, the first year of the hypothetical EMU. In the announcement year 1982, they are
between 13 % (CP: 11.5) in Germany (up from 9 % in the baseline) and 15 % (CP: 12.5) in
France and Italy (down from 16 and 20 % respectively).
The validity of anticipation effects for both interest and exchange rates was shown most
clearly, when there were rumors that Britain would join the real world EMU as of 1999.
Within a few hours, the British-German (long) interest differential shrank by 22 basis points
to only 96. At the same time, the Sterling depreciated by 4 pfennigs to an exchange rate
of 2.83 DM, because an even lower conversion rate is said to have been expected (Financial
Times, 29 September, 1997).
Question 3: Did countries benefit from the European Monetary Union?
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More precisely, the question is if we can make conjectures (or an “educated guess”) about
the macroeconomic effects of the real world EMU relative to the conceptual scenario. It
was argued in question 1 that nominal impulses in simulations conducted in this paper
do actually exist in reality, at least qualitatively. However, it was also acknowledged in
section 2 that nominal interest rates are lower and the monetary policy is more stability-
oriented in the real world EMU than under the hypothetical EMU scenarios presented in
this paper. Acknowledging that the ECB does actually pursue monetary stability a` la
Bundesbank, interest rates in the real world EMU are likely not to have been affected much
in Germany relative to the conceptual scenario without monetary union; but they must
have fallen sharply in Italy or Portugal, for instance – relative to the conceptual scenario.
At the same time, there has probably been a minor depreciation of the DM relative to a
situation without monetary union. The real world Euro depreciation in 1999 may be seen
as supporting evidence. The conjecture of a relative depreciation for the DM in the real
world EMU is based on the assumption that prospective EMU member countries would
have conducted monetary policies geared at somewhat less monetary stability on average
under the conceptual scenario without monetary union.
On balance, Germany no longer seems to suffer from the formation of a monetary union
as suggested by simulation analysis presented in this paper. Instead, she is likely to have
gained from a minor competition effect and also (due to imported inflation) from somewhat
reduced real interest rates – relative to the conceptual scenario. In other words, the slump
in Germany in 2002 and 2003 might have been worse in the absence of the EMU. Similar
conjectures can be made for Austria, the Netherlands, and France, for instance. Countries
(like Italy, Portugal, Spain) with a more ambiguous monetary stability record in the past
are likely to have experienced an appreciation relative to the conceptual scenario without
monetary union, but to have enjoyed reduced nominal and real interest rates. Italy with
an excessively high nominal interest rate in the conceptual scenario (leveraging on her huge
fiscal deficit) is likely to have gained most by the introduction of the real world EMU – just
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as presented for the hypothetical EMU.
Prima facie, it seems likely that a Pareto-superior outcome (in terms of aggregate output
over the longer term) obtains in the real world EMU – relative to the conceptual scenario
– compared to the simulation results. This is due to the larger expansionary interest rate
impulse for Italy and the elimination of the contractionary interest rate impulse in Germany.
Question 4: Was the interest-exchange trade-off (illustrated in this paper) relevant for
decisions associated with the EU Summit in Brussels on 2 May 1998?
Question 4 examines the normative application of simulation findings to real world politics.
Could the knowledge of a potential trade-off between interest and exchange rate impulses
have been used for the decisions on membership and conversion rates taken at the EU
Summit in Brussels on 2 May 1998? Could it have been used for enabling Britain to be part
of the EMU?
Decisions taken at the EU Summit in Brussels were largely determined by political consid-
erations. To avoid haggling over conversion rates central parities of the European Monetary
System were used as conversion rates. Even though market rates of all currencies (but the
Irish punt) adjusted to them more than a year before the start of the real world EMU, it
is questionable if these conversion rates were justified on economic grounds. (In section 4,
it was shown for the hypothetical EMU scenario that CP conversion rates did not have an
economic justification.) The point can best be demonstrated for the Irish case. Markets
generated exchange rates substantially different from conversion rates before 1998. They
were still about 6% different in early 1998. The EMS realignment in March 1998 narrowed
the gap to about 3%, but market rates gradually depreciated to central parities once the
final decision was taken at the Brussels Summit that central parities would be used as con-
version rates at the start of the EMU. By doing so, the EMS did not acknowledge market
rates, but forced the Irish punt to depreciate.
The findings of this paper suggest that this was unreasonable, at least in the case of Ireland.
33
Producing an expansionary exchange rate effect meant reinforcing an expansionary interest
rate effect which was caused by the reduction of interest rates with the start of the EMU. As
a result, Ireland enjoyed a competitive advantage in the EMU, but at the cost of fuelling an
already hot economy. Therefore, the competitive edge did not last long. Asset price inflation
and imported inflation effects lead to an appreciation of real exchange rates. However, the
economic downturn expected by some economists did not happen. The effect of reduced
interest rates (which is much stronger than the one caused by depreciating exchange rates)
is corroborated in The Economist as of 14 November 1998. These adverse effects could have
been alleviated, if the conversion rates had been adjusted at the start of the EMU.
The interest-exchange trade-off could have also been exploited (along the same lines as for
Ireland) to facilitate Britain’s membership in the EMU from an economic point of view.
But the decision to stay out of the real world EMU was politically motivated anyway.
The participation in the EMU would have produced economic problems, because business
cycles in Britain (as in Ireland) and on the Continent were asynchronous in 1998. Lower
(equalized) interest rates caused by the real world EMU would have lead to an overheating
of the economy (as it did in Ireland). In principle (see qualifications in the next paragraph),
it would have been possible though, on an aggregate level , to use an appreciative exchange
rate impulse for curbing the ensuing overexpansion – just as in Ireland.
In reality, this was unrealistic for two reasons. First, there would have been considerable
allocative and distributive effects, but this is also true for Ireland. Second, and probably
more importantly, Britain was not likely to overcome its political rejection of joining at a
high Sterling conversion rate, say at 2.9 or 3 DM
£
. This view has some economic justification,
because high exchange rates (of 2.7 to 3.0 DM
£
during 1998) were overvalued (in contrast
to the situation in Ireland). For instance, purchasing power exchange rates were estimated
at 2.4 or 2.5 DM
£
and real effective exchange rates had drastically risen since 1995 (OECD,
October 1998), i.e. there had already been a considerable loss in competitiveness. All in
all, the case for Britain to join the EMU at high rates was not as strong as it was to revalue
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the central parities for the Irish punt (by 6 instead of 3% to match market rates) in order
to somewhat alleviate expansionary effects caused by the interest rate impulse.
7 Conclusions
Comparative simulation analyses are often used to present results for a particular quanti-
tative question. In this paper, the scope of the analysis is deliberately restricted to under-
standing and applying qualitative findings. Results are derived in a four stage process. In
the first stage, various scenarios for a hypothetical EMU are devised (in sections 1 and 2)
and simulation results obtained. In the second stage, nominal interest and exchange rate
impulses – relative to a situation without monetary union – are analyzed (in sections 3 and
4). Observations 1 to 3 summarize the findings for each impulse under alternative con-
version procedures. Observation 4 captures the crucial role of exchange rate expectations.
Two inferences emerge: (i), standard textbook results cannot be used for analyzing effects
produced by the transition to a monetary union; and (ii), it is disputed that conversion
rates could be indeterminate due to (rational) self-fulfilling prophecies (as argued by de
Grauwe, 1997, Obstfeld, 1998, and de Grauwe, Dewachter, and Veestraeten, 1999), if the
last quotations of market rates before the start of a monetary union are to be used.
As for the third stage, observations 5 and 6 (in section 5) capture the role of transmission
mechanisms and emphasize the potential trade-off between interest and exchange rate im-
pulses. It is shown that the interest rate effect typically determines the overall effect on the
real economy. In the fourth stage, results and insights are applied to the real world EMU
by examining 4 questions (in section 6). Since economic (policy) conditions are qualita-
tively captured by the simulation analysis, it is possible to substantiate anticipation effects
observed in the run-up to the real world EMU. Furthermore, the knowledge of a potential
trade-off between interest and exchange rate impulses can be used in two ways: (i) to make
an “educated guess” (for each current member) of the expected overall macroeconomic costs
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or benefits of joining the EMU; and (ii) to critically review the decisions taken at the EU
Summit in Brussels on 2 May 1998. The main result is that the EMU has probably bene-
fitted most countries, but the interest-exchange trade-off could have been better exploited,
for instance in the Irish case.
The trade-off between nominal interest and nominal exchange rate impulses can also be used
for making some policy recommendations concerning future enlargements of the real world
EMU or relating to any other monetary union. Since most prospective member countries are
likely to gain from lower interest rates, they can be required to join at realistic (not devalued
or undervalued) exchange rates. This may be particularly relevant for prospective applicants
from Eastern Central Europe like Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic. However, care
must be taken to avoid recession or overheating effects, in case interest and exchange rate
impulses reinforce one another (instead of exhibiting trade-off effects). The right timing for
joining a monetary union is crucial, if policy makers want to make sure that conditions are
advantageous for all countries involved.
The analysis of this paper and its interpretations may be criticized, because the interest-
exchange trade-off is not the only effect relevant in a monetary union. First, numerous
behavioral changes (especially concerning money demand and financial markets) which are
conceivable in the real world EMU are not captured. Second, contractionary fiscal policies
required by the Maastricht Treaty may have significant consequences. In principle, the
positive picture for (previously) high interest and high debt countries like Italy may darken
considerably in the short to medium term (though it may prove to be advantageous in the
long run).
However, these limitations do not challenge the main findings of this paper for three reasons.
First, interest and exchange rate impulses and real effects discussed here may be affected (or
even dominated) by other effects, but they are relevant in any monetary union, nonetheless.
In fact, in Bohn (2002) it is shown that the beginning of the EMU offers ideal conditions for
fiscal consolidations because of countervailing expansionary interest rate impulses caused by
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the EMU in highly indebted countries. Second, it may be argued that behavioral changes
or additional requirements (like fiscal consolidations) would have partly happened, even if
the EMU had not been envisaged to start on 1 January 1999. Third, additional require-
ments and behavioral changes do not apply in all countries to the same degree because, for
instance, financial markets work differently in different countries or fiscal consolidations are
not required. Britain is an example for the latter. The main future candidate for the real
world EMU does not have an excessive debt or a deficit beyond the limits set down by the
Maastricht Treaty.
To conclude, this paper has shown that joining members of any monetary union are likely
to experience considerable macroeconomic effects – relative to a situation without monetary
union. This is due to changes in interest and exchange rates which are caused by the
transition to a monetary union. Although this is conventional wisdom, it was not and still
is not accounted for in debate on the EMU. The reason may be that the current discussion
lacks sound theoretical and empirical underpinnings, because the transition to the EMU and
the period after its actual start are typically not included in the same model. Nonetheless,
there is still a need for studying the macroeconomic effects caused by joining a monetary
union as there are future EMU candidates and, possibly, other emerging monetary unions.
Various qualitative effects cannot be shown within the framework of a small theoretical
model, but require the type of simulation exercise presented here: (i) the endogenous change
in depreciation expectations; and (ii) the potential trade-off between interest and exchange
rate impulses.
The implications are far-reaching. First, policy makers may consider to use last-day market
rates as conversion rates, if such conversion rates are – as shown in this paper – economically
sound as well as rationally and uniquely determined (i.e. there is no theoretical indetermi-
nacy problem). As for the EMU, this would be an alternative to fixing conversion rates at
central parities of the ERM II. Second, if better understood, the interest-exchange trade-off
could be exploited by policy makers to cushion the early implications of membership in any
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monetary union. This is particularly relevant for the future enlargement of the EMU. All
in all, it is vital that policy makers are given the theoretical and empirical basis for the
understanding of all effects (micro and macro) produced by joining a monetary union.
Notes
* I am particularly indebted to Arno Ba¨cker, Aditya Goenka, Ju¨rgen von Hagen, Andrew
Hughes Hallett, Peter Kenen, Stefan Lutz, Yue Ma, Christoph Schmidt, Ju¨rgen Siebke and
Paul Welfens. I would also like to thank Paul Masson and Steve Symansky of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (for generous support on MULTIMOD) and seminar participants
of the Econometric Society European Meetings (ESEM), the Money, Macro and Finance
(MMF) Conference, and the Annual Conference of the German Economic Association (VfS).
Finally, I am grateful to the referees for making me rethink some latent features and impli-
cations of the simulation results.
Some preliminary work was done at Princeton University. Financial support by Princeton
University, the International Finance Section, the German Academic Exchange Service, and
the Landesgraduiertenfo¨rderung of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg is gratefully acknowledged.
All remaining errors are mine. – Comments most welcome.
1 In the papers written prior to the start the real world EMU, the procedure for imple-
menting a common currency is either derived from a joint optimization problem for the
two hypothetical EMU countries (in Hughes Hallett and Ma, 1996, and Hughes Hallett and
Vines, 1993) or the market exchange rates of the reference model are imposed as bilateral
conversion rates (in Masson and Melitz, 1991).
2 He can formally show that, initially, the devaluing country experiences a real depreciation
and a positive effect on the current account and on output. Over the medium term, there
is an aggregate expansion, but prices go up, too (due to the excess demand for goods and
because of imported inflation effects). In the long run, the real exchange rate and output
are back at their original levels.
3 A more complete description of the model can be found in Masson, Symansky, and Mered-
ith (1990). It includes theoretical underpinnings and estimation details (univariate, mul-
i
tivariate, pooled estimations; error correction models; calibrations) as well as examples
for using MULTIMOD in policy analyses and standard simulation exercises illustrating
the properties of the model. Inter alia cf. also Bohn (1997) for a stylized core model of
MULTIMOD, and Mitchell, Sault, Smith and Wallis (1995) for comparisons with other
multi-country models.
4 Hill, 1986, p. 140, table 3, bottom line.
5 To be exact, it is not the distance, but the ratio of exchange rates to the US-$ that must
be constant. Even though conversion rates are fixed at 1982 exchange rates under CUR,
this ratio is typically different in 1982, because interest rates are not yet fully harmonized
in the announcement year.
6 In the case of the Dornbusch model, interest rates rise for an increase in the growth rate
of the money supply, but remain constant for a level increase.
7 Since the introduction of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1979 there were
numerous devaluations in Italy (and to a lesser extend in France) as well as revaluations in
Germany. This is certainly true up to 1987, but it might have continued in the 1990s, if
Italy had not dropped out of the ERM in 1992, and if the EMU had not been announced.
8 The Fair-Taylor algorithm (Fair and Taylor, 1983) contains a Gauss-Seidel algorithm
and is more reliable than Newton-Raphson procedures. There is no formal proof that model
solutions are unique, but many simulation experiments based on MULTIMOD (for instance,
by Hughes Hallett and collaborators, Masson et al., and Wallis et al.) and own sensitivity
analyses indicate that unique model solutions can be expected.
9 He presumably refers to the Monetary Conditions Index given by the IMF (1997). The
correct ratio for the UK is 3 to 1.
10 It must be admitted that the data in table 1 could be interpreted differently. If we
include earlier periods, we could argue that there is a trend towards smaller interest rates
and smaller differentials, that would have prevailed with or without the EMU. However,
this view ignores effects originating from obligations for the creation of independent central
banks and from each country’s desire to fulfill the (nominal) Maastricht Criteria.
11 Ireland joined, Italy rejoined the ERM in 1996; the Irish punt was revalued by 3% shortly
before the EU Summit in May 1998.
ii
Appendix A: ’CUR’ Results (left) and Baseline (right)
iii
Appendix B: ’PPP’ (left) and ’CP’ (right) Results
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